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Aid for Trade has been recognized as a tool to integrate developing countries into the 
world economy, induce economic growth and lift its people out of poverty. EU and its 
member states are the biggest donors of Aid for Trade in the world, and one of its biggest 
advocates, but neither Aid for Trade nor the allocation of the European donors, have been 
subject for much earlier research. What has been heavily investigated is development aid, 
where studies have found that aid is allocated according to the needs and merit of the re-
cipient countries, but that the self-interest of the donor tend to outweigh the other motives. 
This might undermine the effectiveness of aid since it has been suggested that aid is more 
efficiently and effective if given to poor countries with good policies.  
This thesis address the gap in research about Aid for Trade, and examine if need, merit or 
self-interest motivates the European donors. A panel data set is constructed using 142 de-
veloping countries and is analysed using OLS regression and fixed effects model. My re-
sults indicate that the European donors allocate their Aid for Trade according to individual 
preferences. Most of the European donors do not seem to be motivated by the need of the 
recipient but rather by self-interest, such as colonial past. The European donors also seem 
to be motivated differently by the merits of the recipients. 
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1In 2013, 767 million people around the world lived in extreme poverty.1 
Development aid has been used for decades with the aim to lift people out of 
poverty, but the benefits of aid have been heavily investigated and questioned. Trade 
could be another factor to lift more people out of poverty, and several trade policy 
initiatives exist to foster economic growth. One such initiative is Aid for Trade. The 
European Union (EU) and its member states represents more than one third of the 
total amount of Aid for Trade, making the union one of the biggest and most 
important donors in the world. Aid for Trade is expressed as one of the key pillars 
of the EU development policies and the Joint EU Aid for Trade strategy has the 
overreaching objective to eradicate poverty. Despite the EU being one of the biggest 
Aid for Trade donor, its activity has not been thoroughly investigated. The aim of 
this thesis is to investigate if the European donors respond to factors in recipient 
countries that make aid more effective in reducing poverty, such as the poverty level 
and the quality of institutions within a recipient country. Or if the Aid for Trade 
allocation mainly is motivated by strategic and political motives? Specifically, I will 
investigate whether the recipients’ development needs, merit or self-interest of the 
donor play a role in the allocation process. 
1.1 Problem statement 
Aid for Trade has received increased attention among development 
organizations and policymakers as a tool to promote economic growth, integrate 
developing countries into the world economy and reduce poverty. It has been widely 
recognized that market access for developing countries is not enough to induce 
economic growth and lifting its people out of poverty. Aid directed at lowering trade 
1 Introduction to understanding poverty at the World Bank http://www.worldbank.org/en/under-
standing-poverty  
1 Introduction 
2costs, many of them found inside the countries, are needed for the countries to enjoy 
the economic advantages of trade and to be a part of the global economy. Since the 
launch of the initiative in 2005, the World Bank and the Organization of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) have published Global Reviews of Aid for 
Trade showing positive results and success stories. Additionally, Aid for Trade has 
been recognized as an important mean by the Sustainable Development Goals to 
accomplish inclusive economic growth and reduce poverty within developing 
countries.2  
EU and its member states are the biggest donors of Aid for Trade in the world, 
and one of its biggest advocates, but neither Aid for Trade nor the allocation of the 
European donors, have been subject for much earlier research. On the contrary, 
development aid has been heavily targeted by researchers. Poor institutional quality, 
poor development, the approach of the western donors and corruption have been 
cited as common reason to why several observers argue that aid flows are wasted 
and are not reducing poverty (Sachs, 2005; Easterly, 2006; Collier, 2007; Moyo, 
2009). At the same time, there is growing evidence that donors may use their 
bilateral development aid to pursue national interest (Berthélemy, 2006a; Hoeffler 
and Outram, 2011; Alesina and Dollar, 2000) and not respond to factors making 
development aid effective. Donors have been found to behave in an egoistic way 
and direct their assistance to their most significant trading partners (Berthélemy, 
2006a). Political and strategic motives have also been found to outweigh the 
development needs of a recipient (Alesina and Dollar, 2000).  
Different donors also claim to have different strategies with their foreign 
assistance and development aid. The actual motives of the donors have been heavily 
discussed and have focused on altruistic behaviors (focusing on need and merit of 
the recipient) or egoistic behavior (donor self-interest). The European Union and its 
member states claims the aim of their foreign assistance to be altruistic with the 
overreaching goal to eradicate poverty (EU, 2006; EU, 2007) and to prioritize least-
developed countries. Other donors have their own purpose with rationales for 
foreign assistance. Japan and the US are among the biggest donor of development 
aid and Aid for Trade in the world but differs in their motives. The US clearly claims 
that the objectives of its foreign assistance is national security, commercial interest 
and humanitarian concerns (Lawson and Tarnoff, 2018).  The objectives of Japans 
foreign assistance claims to be altruistic and like the Europeans the country want to 
promote universal values and to ensure world peace, stability and prosperity 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, 1992).   
2 Further reading about Sustainable Development Goal 8 “Decent Work and Economic Growth” 
http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/sustainable-development-goals/goal-8-decent-work-and-
economic-growth.html  
31.2 Aim of the study 
With this thesis, I will address the gap in research regarding Aid for Trade and 
how the European donors allocates their Aid for Trade. The potential of Aid for 
Trade to eradicate poverty has been highly praised both among governments and 
organizations but if the donors allocates their Aid for Trade out of self-interest (and 
not development needs or institutional quality) it could potentially undermine the 
efficiency. I will also compare the European donors’ allocation with two of the 
largest Aid for Trade donors: Japan and the U.S. The methodology will build on the 
paper by Hoeffler and Outram (2011) but applied on Aid for Trade data and on the 
donors: the EU Institutions, Germany, France, UK, Sweden, Japan and the US. The 
choice of explanatory variables will also be adjusted to fit Aid for Trade flows and 
not general aid flows. 
The research question is: 
• How are the European Aid for Trade flows allocated? Specifically, if the
needs of the recipient, merit of the recipient or the self- interest of the
donor are motivations in the allocation process?
With the objectives: 
• To investigate how Germany, France, UK, Sweden and the EU
Institutions allocate their Aid for Trade flows, and if the allocation is
motivated by the needs and merit of the recipient or self-interest of the
donor.
• To compare how Germany, France, UK, Sweden and the EU Institutions
allocate their Aid for Trade flows.
• To investigate how the European donors’ allocation compares to the
biggest donors outside Europe: The US and Japan
2 Background 
2.1 Aid for trade – What is it? 
Trade has been identified in various empirical literature to be an engine for long 
run economic growth and to reduce poverty (e.g., Grossman and Helpman, 1990; 
Romer, 1990). Developing countries may therefore have much to gain by increased 
trade and trade openness. Over the last decades the world has seen a substantial 
increase in international trade with trade agreements, lower tariffs and lower trade 
barriers. The increasing participation of developing countries in the world economy 
raised concerns that the developing countries cannot harness the economic 
opportunities given to them. Increased aid has been argued as vital to do the big 
investment in infrastructure and product capacity necessary to overcome the supply 
side constraints and high adjustment cost the developing countries are facing 
(Stiglizt and Charlton, 2006; Rodrik, 2001). The countries may lack the necessary 
knowledge and technology to meet the product standard in exports market such as 
certification and sanitary measures, or lack the exporting infrastructure such as 
communication, efficient ports and decent roads. The institutions within countries 
could also be inefficient resulting in high administrative costs, such as custom 
clearing time, inefficient policies or corruption. (Hoekman and Nicita, 2011) 
Against this background, the Aid for Trade initiative was launched in 2005 at the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) Hong Kong Ministerial Conference. At the 
meeting the countries agreed to help developing countries build the capacity they 
needed to take advantage of trade opportunities. The Aid for Trade initiative was 
taken in consensus among the WTO members and meant a significant change in the 
importance of trade-related development assistance within development and trade 
policies (Page, 2007). A new consensus emerged which accepted that trade policies 
focusing only on trade openness are not enough for developing countries to benefit 
from market opportunities, achieve economic growth and reduce poverty. In 
fact, 
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5many developing countries have been unable to use trade as an engine for growth 
because they are facing difficulties in trading due to supply side constraints and 
trade-related obstacles. The idea to lower trade costs and trade obstacles for 
developing countries, so they can enjoy the economic advantages of increased trade, 
is not new. It has been pursued by aid donors and developing country governments 
for many years. But for the first time at the Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong 
in 2005, both the development and international trade communities acknowledged 
that the matters concerned them both (Hoekman, 2010). 
2.1.1 Definition and evolution of Aid for Trade 
The Director General of the WTO announced the composition of an Aid for 
Trade Taskforce in February 2006. The objectives of the taskforce were to 
investigate the needs of the developing countries and to operationalize the initiative. 
In July 2006, the Trade Task Force proposed, together with highlighting the 
importance of trade in poverty reduction, six categories to measure Aid for Trade: 
Table 1. The six categories proposed by the Aid for Trade Taskforce. 
Category Definition 
Trade-related infrastructure Physical infrastructure with the aim to connect domestic and 
foreign markets. For example, roads, communication, ports. 
Building productive capacity Aid to make countries be able to diversify production and exports. 
Trade-related adjustment costs Aid to help the countries with the adjustment cost. For example, 
tariff reductions or trade policy set out by other countries 
Trade development Aid to support development within trade sectors. For example, 
investment promotion, market analysis and development. 
Trade policy and regulations Aid to comply with rules and product standard but also to analyse 
the effect of trade proposals and positions. For example, aid 
directed towards facilitate implementation of trade agreements 
and comply with rules and product standards and training of trade 
officials. 
Other trade-related Other trade related support not captured by the categories above 
Source: WTO, 2006 
Since the launch of Aid for Trade, the initiative has gained an increased interest 
both among trade and development policy makers. In 2007, only two years after the 
launch of the initiative, the first WTO/OECD review showed that Aid for Trade is 
6of growing importance in the donors’ development programmes (OECD and WTO, 
2007). In 2011, the WTO and OECD published its third monitoring reports where 
focus was to evaluate the initiative since its start in 2006. The report indicated 
positive tangible results and that the initiative has achieved considerable progress in 
short time (OECD and WTO, 2011).  
Both countries and donor agencies are more and more prioritizing Aid for Trade 
in their development strategies, which can be seen in the average annual growth rate 
of commitments by 16% and disbursement by 11-12% between 2006-2011.3  
Disbursements are the actual payment each year from the donor to the recipient 
country, while commitments represent an obligation undertaken by the donor. The 
commitment consists of monetary assistance to a recipient country and are often 
disbursement spread over several years. In 2011, the commitments were 57% above 
the commitment baseline from 2002-2005. The Aid for Trade disbursement flows 
increased from 18,140 million USD in 2005 to 39,421 million USD dollar in 2015, 
which is equivalent to an average annual growth rate of around 12%.  
Asia and Africa have received the largest share of Aid for Trade followed by the 
Americas, Europe and last Oceania (see Figure 1). The Aid for Trade flows to Africa 
experienced a rapid growth and almost three doubled between 2005 and 2015 but 
stalled during the last years. Aid for Trade to emerging European countries declined 
between 2011 and 2015, while other regions remained relatively stable. Between 
2005-2015, 38% of the Aid for Trade flows was disbursed to Asia and 35% was 
disbursed to Africa (OECD, 2015). The dominating Aid for Trade flows are aimed 
at projects in economic infrastructure (47%) and building productive capacity 
(52%). The four biggest sectors in receiving Aid for Trade financed projects have 
been transport and storage (29%), energy generation and supply (21%), agriculture 
(18%) and banking (10%). The four sectors are closely related to cutting trade costs 
and up to 2015 more than 75% of total Aid for Trade had gone to projects within 
these sectors. The potential and importance of trade and Aid for Trade to reduce 
poverty is gaining more attention and flows are increasing. Partner countries and 
donors are prioritizing trade in their development strategies where the share of Aid 
for Trade in sector allocable aid rose from 31% to 38 % between 2006-2013 (OECD, 
2015). Studies made by OECD predicts that 1% in global trade costs could increase 
global income by a minimum of 40 USD billion, where 63% would be generated by 
developing countries. 
3 Aid for trade showing results http://www.oecd.org/dac/Aid for Trade/Policy_brief_Aid for 
Trade_Showing_Results.pdf  
7 
Figure 1. Total Aid for Trade disbursement flows per region between 2005-2015 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on OECD DAC Database. 
2.2 European Aid for Trade 
The EU presented in 2007 its own Aid for Trade strategy. The Joint EU Aid for 
Trade strategy strives to increase the total amount of Aid for Trade and do it in 
coherence with other development goals, such as the gradual increase in overall 
development aid, to make sure that an increase in Aid for Trade are not achieved at 
the expense of other priorities. The EU strategy on Aid for Trade is focused on the 
needs of the recipients and has the aim to: 
“[..] support all developing countries, particularly Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs), to better integrate into the rules-based world trading system and to more 
effectively use trade in promoting the overarching objective of eradication of 
poverty in the context of sustainable development” (EU, 2007)  
The strategy is based on external documents (Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness, WTO-Doha agenda, the Millennium Development Goals) and the EU 
Code of Conduct on complementarity and division of labour in development policy.  
In the strategy, the EU states that Aid for Trade is an important complement to trade 
negotiations and is crucial for developing countries to successfully implement trade 
agreements and enjoy the economic benefits coming from trade. The strategy is a 
guide to how the EU and its member states should use their Aid for Trade, based on 
voluntarily and flexible basis and on the recommendation from the WTO 2006 Task 
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8Force. Although no special commitments were made in 2007, other than EU 
collectively pledge to strive to increase its expenditure on trade policy and 
regulations and trade development, OECD numbers shows that EU was also a major 
donor in the other categories of Aid for Trade. The strategy of 2007 is composed of 
five pillars: 
1. Collectively increasing the volume of European Aid for Trade. EU
institution and member states commits to collectively spend €2 billion
annually on Trade-Related Assistance.
2. Enhancing the quality and the pro-poor focus of European Aid for Trade;
3. Increase the capacity of European Aid for Trade to be in line with globally
agreed effective aid principles;
4. To have an African, Caribbean and the Pacific-specific angle (APEC) of the
European Aid for Trade strategy.
5. To monitor and report Aid for Trade effectively. Under this pillar, the EU
publishes annual Aid for Trade Monitoring Reports where the EU reports on
the Aid for Trade progress.
The EU and its member states have collectively been the largest donor of Aid 
for Trade since the launch of the initiative, representing 39% of all the Aid for Trade 
disbursement between 2005-2015, while 61% have been from other countries and 
agencies. More than 70% of the European Aid for Trade have been provided by the 
EU institutions, Germany and France. The evolution of the European Aid for Trade 
is presented in Figure 2. From 2005 to 2015 the Aid for Trade flows increased with 
an annual of 22%. Africa has been the biggest recipient of European Aid for Trade 
with almost 36% of the amount committed in 2010 and 55% in 2013. Other 
important recipients of European Aid for Trade are Asia and the EU.  
Figure 2. Total European Aid for Trade disbursement flows between 2005-2015 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on OECD DAC Database. 
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The motivations behind the allocation of development aid have been thoroughly 
examined during the last decades. Many studies have been motivated by the 
question if the main motives have been development or other motives, such as self-
interest (e.g., Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Hoeffler and Outram, 2011; Collier and 
Dollar, 2001a, b). The increased attention to aid effectiveness has resulted in much 
research regarding development aid flows, but because of Aid for Trade is relatively 
new it has not been subject for much research. In theory, the linkage between 
increased trade and development is straightforward: trade facilitation leads to an 
expansion of trade, investment and production opportunities which in turn leads to 
income growth, and hence development (Helble et al., 2012). Trade facilitation 
initiatives, such as Aid for Trade, can be directed at lowering trade costs leading to 
an expansion of trade flows and an increase in trade competitiveness. In reality, the 
linkage between trade facilitation and development is more complex and difficult. 
Initiatives directed at trade facilitation and lowering trade costs meet other 
challenges such as the national contexts, political and economic structures in the 
recipient country, private sector priorities, development agendas and national 
interests.  
3.1 Previous research: How does Aid for Trade work? 
The Aid for Trade initiative was launched in 2005 and has not been as targeted 
by research as development aid.  The research that exist has found Aid for Trade 
initiatives, aimed at reducing trade cost, to correlate to an increased trade 
performance. It has been suggested that 1% in Aid for Trade facilitation correlates 
to an increase in export worth of USD 290 million for the recipient countries (Helbe 
3 Literature review and theoretical 
framework 
et al., 2012) and that Aid for Trade also has a positive effect on the trade 
performance of the donor (Hühne et al., 2014). 
Other initiatives directed at lowering trade costs have shown evidence to have a 
positive impact on trade and growth, where different trade facilitation measures 
work through different channels. The importance of infrastructure and 
transportation cost in explaining trade and access to markets have been highlighted 
by various researchers. Clark et al. (2004) investigated the importance of 
infrastructure and transportation cost to the US market for Latin American countries 
and found that improving port efficiency from the 25th to the 75th percentile 
resulted in a reduction in shipping cost by 12%. Sea port efficiency included 
activities related to custom requirements, cargo handling, port infrastructure etc. 
The infrastructure was further highlighted by the findings that having bad ports was 
equivalent to being 60% further away from export markets. Shepherd and Wilson 
(2006) showed that road quality has a big effect on regional trade flows. They used 
a gravity model simulation applied on 138 cities in 27 countries across Central Asia 
and Europe and found that ambitious road update program could boost intra-
regional trade up to 50%. Their research also indicated positive intra-regional spill 
over effects on trade from improving road quality in countries which are important 
transit corridors. Product standards and technical regulations, set out by developed 
countries, have also been suggested as important factors driving trade costs, 
especially for developing countries.  Chen et al. (2006) quantified the impact of 
technical regulations and standards and found that difficulties in accessing 
information lead to a discourage among exporters by 18%. Firms affected by testing 
procedures were shown to have between 9-16% smaller export share.  
Communication has also been stated as an important determinant of trade costs and 
trade facilitation aimed reducing communication cost has been shown to have a 
significant influence on trade patterns (Fink et al., 2005).  
3.2 Previous research: Aid allocation theory 
3.2.1 Aid – need, merit and effectiveness 
Various factors and variables influence aid, and development aid is as much as 
a matter of knowledge as it is about money. The correlation and effectiveness 
between aid and poverty reduction is complex and it is difficult to establish 
causation due to many things coincide and correlates. The World Bank concluded 
that what really makes a difference is if the development aid is given to a country 
10
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that pursue effective policies and have development needs (World Bank, 1998). On 
the other side of the debate, research is also suggesting that there is little evidence 
that aid is working at all (Easterly, 2006).  But still, researchers have been motivated 
to investigate the effectiveness and motives of aid, and many researchers have 
looked at recipients need, merits and the self-interest when investigating them (e.g. 
Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Hoeffler and Outram, 2011; Collier and Dollar, 2001a, 
b). 
Research suggest that if development aid is efficiently allocated the productivity 
of the current aid could be greatly improved (Collier and Dollar, 2001b). Collier and 
Dollar (2001b) argues that aid is allocated inefficiently and targeted to countries 
which have weak policies and do not have severe poverty problems. They argue that 
the effectiveness of aid depends on the recipients’ poverty level and the quality of 
its policies, and that effectiveness of aid could be greatly improved if aid is allocated 
to poor countries with development friendly economic policies.  They derived a 
formula for poverty-efficient allocation of aid and compered it to the actual aid 
allocation among donors which resulted in the conclusion.  
When looking at recipients’ merits, aid has been found to be more effective when 
given to developing countries with sound institutions, good economic policies and 
good trade policies (Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Collier and Dollar, 2001a). If the 
recipient country has poor polices (measured by the Freedom House Democracy 
index), foreign aid has little effect on growth in GDP per capita. Burnside and Dollar 
(2000) used a database on foreign aid developed by the World Bank, a panel of 56 
countries between the years 1970-73 to 1990-93 and introduced an aid-policy 
interaction term in the growth regression. When they revisited their results in 2004 
they found even stronger evidence that institutional quality effects the relationship 
between aid and growth (Burnside and Dollar, 2004). 
There is mixed evidence that the donors are rewarding economic, political and 
social performance. Nunnenkamp and Thiele (2006) found that few donors 
preferred recipients that offered promising condition for aid to be effective. 
Additionally, none of the major donors responded to change in policy quality in the 
recipient countries. They used aggregated aid data from all the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) countries, nine big donors and applied it on a Tobit 
model. The variables measurement of the governmental merits where measured by 
the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). Hoeffler and Outram (2011) also 
found that the allocation decision of the donor correlates poorly to the merits. They 
analysed aid flows from 22 donors between 1980-2004, used data from the Polity 
IV dataset, GDP per capita, UN voting patterns and found similar results. However, 
economic and social performance have been found in some papers to be rewarded 
by donors (e.g., Berthélemy and Tichit, 2004; Gates and Hoeffler, 2004).  
3.2.2 Donors self-interest 
Previous studies have found strong indications that foreign assistance is allocated 
according to the donors’ self-interest. The research up to date has found that the 
interest of the donor has been outweighing the needs of the recipient, even if the 
development needs and merits of the recipient has been suggested to be important 
in terms of efficiency and effectiveness. One of the most influential paper in the aid 
allocation debate is Alesina and Dollar (2000) and their findings that donors cares 
more about economic, political and strategical factors than the development need of 
the recipients. Their findings suggest that colonial past and political alliances are 
mayor determinants of aid allocation and explain more of the allocation of aid than 
the political institutions or economic policies of the recipient. They used data on 
bilateral aid flows from the DAC countries between 1970-1994 and included 
variables such as trade openness, democracy, colonial status and civil liberties. The 
findings have been shown to be robust (Berthélemy and Tichit, 2004; Berthélemy, 
2006; Hoeffler and Outram, 2011) and there is evidence that donors’ self-interest is 
an important driver of the aid allocation. For example, Berthélemy (2006b) results 
suggest that donors behave in an egoistic way and target their aid to their most 
significant trade partners. He also finds difference among donors’ behaviour; one 
example is the Nordic countries being more altruistic in their allocation decision. 
Berthélemy and Tichit (2004) finds that good economic policies have been rewarded 
but also that trade partners get favoured. The results suggested by Hoffler and 
Outram (2011) also shows that donors provide more aid to their trade partners and 
some donors provided more aid to countries who vote alongside them at the U.N. 
12
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The motives of development aid have been heavily targeted by earlier research. 
GDP per capita has been commonly used as a proxy for the recipient poverty levels 
and needs (e.g., Hoeffler and Outram 2011; Alesina and Dollar 2000), and the 
governmental merits have been proxied by both the Freedom House Democracy 
Index (e.g. Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Collier and Dollar, 2001a,b; Hoeffler and 
Outram, 2011) and the Worldwide Governance Index (e.g., Nunnenkamp and 
Thiele, 2006). When looking at the donors’ self-interest both colonial past, UN 
voting pattern and export have been used (e.g., Alseina and Dollar, 2000; Hoeffler 
and Outram 2011; Berthélemy and Tichit, 2004). This thesis will follow the 
methodology set out in Hoeffler and Outram (2011) but applied on Aid for Trade 
data and using the Worldwide Governmental Index as proxies for governmental 
merits. 
4.1 Data 
4.1.1 Dependent variable 
The Aid for Trade variable is obtained from the online OECD database on Aid 
for Trade statistics: QWIDS. The database is based on the aid flows reported to the 
Credit Reporting System (CRS) and covers around 90% of all the Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) directed towards developing countries. The 
QWIDS database are extracted from 12 categories in the CRS data system and have 
proxied the Aid for Trade flows under the following five categories: 
• Technical assistance for trade policy and regulations
• Economic infrastructure
• Productive capacity building
• Trade-related adjustment
• Other trade-related needs
4 Methodology and data 
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The CRS database cannot provide data that exactly match the categories 
proposed by the WTO Aid for Trade Task Force recommendations in 2005 but have 
been recognized as being the best existing data source for Aid for Trade flows.4 The 
CRS database consist of comparable data over time and countries, including ODA 
loans and grants with both commitments and disbursement. In the QWIDS data base 
the Aid for Trade flows are converted into constant USD 2015.  
There is no consensus in the literature on whether to use disbursement or 
commitment data when looking at the strategic decision of the donor. Berthélemy 
and Tichit (2004) use commitment data as it would better reflect donors’ motives, 
other studies use disbursement data (Nunnenkamp and Thiele, 2006) motivated by 
that the decision to implement aid reflects an important process. This thesis will use 
disbursement data as the dependent variable because it measures the amount of Aid 
for Trade being transferred from the donor to the recipient a specific year, and hence 
the actual transfer.  
A panel data set is constructed with the five biggest European donors: EU 
Institutions, Germany, France, UK and Sweden and their Aid for Trade flows 
between 2005-2015 using yearly disbursement data. Data from the US and Japan 
will also be extracted from the source and included in the panel data to be able to 
compare the allocation decision of the European donors to other big Aid for Trade 
donors. The data reported to the CRS system, and hence showed in the QWIDS 
database, could be of negative figures and would relate to when repayment from a 
recipient country on loans were larger than the ODA received that year.  
4.1.2 Explanatory variables 
The explanatory variables will be categorized into three groups: 
• Recipients need. The variable will help to analyse if donors allocate
more or less aid to poorer countries. The coefficient should be negative
if donors are prioritizing to allocate their Aid for Trade to poorer
countries with higher needs.
• Recipients merits. The variables will help to analyse if donors allocate
more or less aid to countries with better policies and merits. The
coefficients should be positive if donors reward good governance among
the recipient countries.
• The donor self-interest. The variable will help to analyse if donor
allocates more or less aid to countries where they have national interest.
4 At the Review of the Monterrey Consensus on Fincancial and Development in 2008 the CRS 
database was recognized as being the best data source for tracking Aid for Trade flows. 
http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/doha/chapter3/OECD_submission.pdf 
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If donors are prioritizing to allocate their Aid for Trade to countries 
where they have interest, the coefficient will be positive. 
The recipients’ income per capita is commonly used in aid allocation literature 
to demonstrate the recipient needs, but average income does not work well to 
measure the need of the recipient if the distribution is highly skewed. Therefore, I 
will use the Poverty headcount ratio at USD 1.90 a day obtained from the World 
Bank database. The indicator shows the proportion of people below the poverty line 
USD 1.90 a day (extreme poverty) and is adjusted to 2011 Purchasing Power Parity 
dollars.  The variable measures the percent of people in a country living in poverty 
and is a better measurement to capture how poor a country is.  There are missing 
observations for some of the recipient countries, which was not surprising due to 
the availability of poverty data is suffering from large gaps where almost half of the 
countries are deprived of adequate data on poverty.5 Therefore, I adjusted for the 
missing observation on the Poverty headcount ratio by applying the average growth 
rate for the individual countries during the years of missing observation. For 
recipients with no poverty data between 2005-2015 at all, the observation is reported 
as missing during the whole period.  
Good policies have been suggested in earlier research to be an important factor 
for the success and effectiveness of development aid (Burnside and Dollar, 2000). 
To represent the donor’s merit, I will therefore use the World Bank Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI) together with the growth of GDP per capita. The 
variable growth of GDP per capita will be representing good economic policies and 
is extracted from the World Development Indicators by the World Bank. The 
variable is based on local currency and converted on an aggregated level to constant 
USD 2010. The WGI will represent good governance and captures six areas of 
governance: Voice and accountability, Political Stability and Lack of Violence, 
Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control for 
Corruption. The variable measuring Voice and Accountability will be proxied as the 
level of democracy in the recipient country. The WGI indicators captures broad 
dimensions of governance and are the result of a long going project to develop cross-
country variables for Good Governance. The data set is based on around 30 different 
data sources such as surveys of firms and household, non-governmental 
organizations, public sector organizations, commercial information providers, and 
includes 340 different variables. The WGI indicators range from -2.5 to 2.5 and have 
been used widely for research purposes.  
I will also add a variable describing how open a country is for trade: Trade 
openness. The variable will be obtained from the World Development Indicator 
5From the World Bank blog:  http://blogs.worldbank.org/developmenttalk/much-world-de-
prived-poverty-data-let-s-fix 
database and is calculated by dividing the value of the export and import with the 
recipients GDP. The variable is relevant because the purpose with Aid for Trade is 
to integrate developing countries into the international economy. I will lag the merit 
variables with one year to overcome the endogeneity issue because of potential 
reverse causality.  
The variables representing the donors’ self-interest will be measured in the 
donors’ export to recipient and the colonial past. Colonial past has been found in 
earlier research to be a major motive of the allocation of bilateral aid (Alesina and 
Dollar, 2000) and I create dummy variables describing if the recipient has been a 
colony of France, UK or Germany during the 20th century. The export data come 
from the UN Comtrade database which contains only trade in products and will be 
a proxy for commercial interest. To overcome the reverse causality of aid and trade, 
I lag the trade variable with one year.  
Some of the recipient had to be excluded from the dataset due to insufficient data 
on the different explanatory variables. For example, this included some countries 
which during the period were suffering from internal conflicts and war: Libya, Syria 
and Somalia. Kosovo, Sudan and South Sudan were also excluded due to South 
Sudan gained their independence in 2011 from Sudan and Kosovo for its 
independence in 2008. Additionally, Special Administrative Regions such as Macau 
(China) and Overseas Collectively French Polynesia were excluded, as well as small 
island states such as Niue, Saint Helena and Wallis and Futuna. The countries 
received little or no Aid for Trade from the donors and had missing observations in 
several of the explanatory variables.  
4.1.3 Control variables 
With the respect to control variables, I follow Hoeffler and Outram (2011) and 
control for population. Additionally, I add a dummy variable if a recipient is 
landlocked according to the UNCTAD list of landlocked developing countries due 
to the higher cost of trading. Landlocked countries could potentially lead to donors 
trying to compensate for the higher cost and allocate more Aid for Trade (Tadasse 
and Fayissa, 2009). Belarus and Serbia are added additionally since they we’re not 
on the UN list of landlocked countries. Last, I will also control for if the recipient is 
a member of the European Generalized Schemes of Preference (GSP) and in the 
APEC trade agreement by adding dummy variables. The GSP program grants better 
access to European market for certain developing countries and the APEC region 
has a special focus in the European Aid for Trade strategy.  The dummy variables 
will take the value of 1 of the recipient countries are landlocked, member of the GSP 
or in the APEC and zero otherwise.  
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 Table 1. Overview and description of explanatory variables and control variables. 
Variable Description Mean Min Max 
Standard 
deviation 
Need 
Poverty at $1.90 a day Percentage of population living under $1.90 a day 18.98 0 78.5 21.89 
Merit 
Growth of GDP per capita Annual GDP growth in % 2.86 -36.83 34.79 4.756 
Government Effectiveness 
Measures the quality of public services and its independence from 
political pressure. Between -2.5 to 2.5. 
-0.41 -2.04 1.57 0.696 
Voice and Accountability 
Measures freedom of expression, association and to which extent 
citizen can select their government. Between -2.5 to 2.5 
-0.29 -2.26 1.29 .849 
Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism 
Measures political instability and the likelihood of political motivated 
violence and terrorism. Between -2.5 to 2.5 
-0.30 -2.83 1.45 0.903 
Regulatory Quality 
Measures the ability of the government to formulate and implement 
policies and regulation that permit and promote private sector 
development. Between -2.5 to 2.5 
-0.403 -2.27 1.54 0.714 
Rule of Law 
Measures the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by 
the rules of society. Between -2.5 to 2.5 
-0.415 -2.03 1.43 0.711 
Control of Corruption 
Measures the perception to which extent power is exercised for private 
gain. Between -2.5 to 2.5 
-0.401 -1.77 1.72 0.68 
Trade openness 
Trade as a % of GDP.  
(Value of export + import)/GDP 
83.94 0 311.36 37.29 
Self-interest 
Export (USD millions) Export donor to recipient 2085.3 0 240247 10584.39 
Former colony France 
Dummy variables which takes value 1 if recipient being a colony to 
France during the 20th century 
0.162 0 1 - 
Former colony UK 
Dummy variables which takes value 1 if recipient being a colony to UK 
during the 20th century 
0.317 0 1 - 
Former colony Germany 
Dummy variables which takes value 1 if recipient being a colony to 
Germany during the 20th century 
0.148 0 1 - 
Control variables 
Population (millions) Population within the recipient country 39.56 0.01 1371.22 153.785 
Landlocked 
Dummy variable which takes value 1 if recipient begin on the 
UNCTAD list of landlocked countries 
0.232 0 1 - 
GSP Signatory 
Dummy variable which takes value 1 if recipient being signatory of 
GSP 
0.549 0 1 - 
GSP+ Signatory 
Dummy variable which takes value 1 if recipient being signatory of 
GSP+ 
0.211 0 1 - 
APEC member 
Dummy variable which takes value 1 if recipient being member of 
APEC 
0.077 0 1 -
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4.2 Econometric Model 
I use the most common estimation model in the aid allocation literature (Alesina 
and Dollar, 2000; Hoeffler and Outram, 2011) and calculate separate equations for 
each donor using a pooled OLS regression: 
Aidijt = α + βiXijt + uijt 
where the t represents time, i represent the donor, j represents the recipient and 
Aid represent the Aid for Trade disbursement from a donor to a recipient. 
Furthermore, the X denotes a vector of explanatory variables (recipient needs, 
recipients merit and donors’ self-interest), α is a constant and uijt is an error term. 
The equation above may be biased due to the panel data structure. For instance, an 
error term may correlate within a country or a year. One way to address this issue is 
to use clustered standard errors in the OLS regression or to use a country fixed 
effects model or random fixed effect model.  
The random effects model can use time-invariant information and provide more 
efficient estimates. However, these may be biased. The fixed effects model controls 
for all – observed and unobserved – time-invariant factors. The country fixed effects 
model addresses the correlations within a country and allows for identification of 
the causal relationship and exploit the within observations by subtracting the 
country mean from the variables (first differences). In the random fixed effects 
model the country-specific effects are treated as uncorrelated with the explanatory 
variables and treated as random. To decide if random effects or fixed effects should 
be applied, a Hausman test (1978) can be used. If the Hausman test does not reject 
the null hypothesis, the more efficient random effects model is preferred. Under the 
alternate hypothesis, the fixed effects model provides consistent estimates.  
The empirical analysis has three stages: 
1. Look at the aggregate data and the donors one-by-one to see if need, merit
and self-interest motivates the European donors in their Aid for Trade
allocation.
2. Compare the European donors with each other to see if they differ in their
allocation by only using the recipient-year observations the donors have in
common (a method proposed by Hoeffler and Outram (2011) to overcome
the comparability issue following comparing donors using different
samples).
3. Thirdly, I will compare the European donors to the U.S and Japan. I will
restrict the sample to only common observations.
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4.3 Summary statistics 
Africa is by far the poorest region in the sample with an average of 38% of its 
population living on less than USD 1.90 a day (see Appendix 1). The region has a 
high standard deviation due to countries like Burundi, Demo. Rep. of Congo, 
Madagascar and Malawi having a poverty rate over 70% during the period, and other 
countries such as Algeria, Mauritius, Morocco and Seychelles having poverty rates 
under 4%. Oceania, Asia and the Americas all score around the same poverty rates, 
7-13%, and have high standard deviation due to the poverty rates within the regions 
also have big variations ranging from 0%-56% in Asia, 0%-37% in the Americas 
and 0.6-38% in Oceania. The region with the least poverty rate in our sample are 
the Middle East and Europe where the poverty rate for both regions is around 2%, 
which is a result of Georgian and Macedonian poverty rates (as high as 19% for 
Georgia) which drive up the poverty rates for Europe, while poverty data from the 
Middle East is missing for Oman and Saudi Arabia.  
Africa, Asia and the Middle East are the regions where we find recipients with 
the lowest governmental qualities measured by the WGI (see Appendix 1). The 
Middle East stand out as the recipient region with the highest rate of political 
instability, where Iraq and Yemen scores lower than -2, and the lowest scores on the 
proxy for democracy (Voice and Accountability), where Saudi Arabia has the lowest 
rate (as low as -1.9). Africa is the recipient region with the lowest governmental 
qualities regarding rule of law and government effectiveness. Asia is the region with 
most corruption, and the region has lower scores on democracy and a higher level 
of political instability than to Africa. Countries such as Afghanistan and Pakistan 
are countries with high levels of political instability, with scores around -2.5, while 
Myanmar and Turkmenistan are countries with scores as low as -2.2 on democracy. 
Asia is also the recipient region with the highest rate of fast growing economies 
where countries like China, Myanmar and Turkmenistan have high growth rates 
around 10-12% during the period, while the Middle East has the lowest rate of 
economic growth. Europe, followed by Oceania, are the regions most open to trade. 
Based on the indicators, the regions with the most need is Africa, Asia and Oceania, 
and should be prioritized over Europe and the Americas. Europe and the Americas 
are the regions with the lowest poverty rates and the best quality of governance 
All donor countries, except the US, export most of their goods to recipients in 
Asia (see Appendix 2). In the case of the US, the country export most of its goods 
to the Americas region where most of the export between 2005-2015 goes to Mexico 
and Brazil.  
Both Germany and UK allocate most Aid for Trade to countries in the Asia while 
the EU Institutions and Sweden allocate most Aid for Trade to countries in Europe. 
France is the only donor country with most of its Aid for Trade allocated to 
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recipients in Africa. Oceania is the region which receives the least Aid for Trade 
and export from the donor countries, except Japan. This is probably due to Oceania 
being mostly made up by small island states, and very close to Japan in comparison 
to other donors, and hence not being prioritized by other donors. The US Aid for 
Trade is highly concentrated to the Middle East region, where most of the aid during 
the period is allocated to Iraq.  
The summary statistics gives an indication that the Aid for Trade flows may not 
be allocated according to the recipient needs since all donors, except France, give 
most Aid for Trade to other regions than Africa. Germany, UK and Japan also direct 
more Aid for Trade to the recipients in the region where most of their export are 
directed. The results of the summary statistics motivate further the aim of the thesis. 
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5.1 European donors 
5.1.1 All observations donor-by-donor 
Several OLS regressions with clustered standard errors at country level are 
estimated on the European donors and presented in estimations (1)-(5) in Table 2. 
The results indicate that the individual European donors are motivated differently 
by needs, merits and self-interest when allocating their Aid for Trade. The variable 
“Governmental Effectiveness” was excluded due to high VIF-values6 indicating 
multicollinearity and strong correlations between the variables measuring the rule 
of law and the government effectiveness.  
The poverty level in the recipient country does not seem to be a motivation for 
most of the European donor, where the EU Institutions and the UK are the only 
donors giving more Aid for Trade to poorer countries. Two of the five pillars in the 
European Aid for Trade strategy is to enhance the pro-poor focus and to have an 
APEC specific angle but not all the European donors seems to allocate more aid to 
poorer countries, neither to allocate more to APEC-members. In fact, the EU 
Institutions, Germany and Sweden seem to allocate less to a recipient being a 
member of APEC. 
The results indicate that the European donors are motivated differently by the 
governmental qualities and merits of the recipients, and generally not motivated by 
the governmental qualities measured by the WGI. The UK allocates less Aid for 
Trade to recipients with higher political stability while Sweden allocates more aid 
to recipients with higher political stability. Regulatory quality is rewarded by the 
EU Institutions and Germany. France is not motivated at all by the level of the 
6 VIF-values over 10 for Rule of law and Government Effectiveness (all donors) 
5 Empirical results 
governmental qualities or merits in its allocation of Aid for Trade. The coefficients 
of the level of democracy are statistically not significant for all European donors. 
The other merit variables, measuring trade openness and economic growth, also 
differ among the individual donors. How open a country is for trade is statistically 
significant for the allocation of Sweden and UK, which give more aid to recipients 
with a high degree of trade openness. Germany and Sweden seem to be the only 
donors acknowledging the increased trade cost facing recipients that are landlocked 
and give more Aid for Trade to landlocked recipients. In line with Hoeffler and 
Outram (2011), there is mixed evidence of the “small country bias” found in the 
paper by Alesina and Dollar (2000). Recipient countries with smaller population 
receive more Aid for Trade from the EU institutions, France and Sweden.  
All donors seem to be motivated by their self-interest, especially by colonial past. 
The colonial past is statistically significant for all the donors (as found in Alesina 
and Dollar, 2000). Both France and UK give more Aid for Trade to their old 
colonies. The colonial past of other European donors seems also to motivate all the 
European donors where Germany favours old colonies of UK and UK favours 
former colony of Germany. Sweden and UK, on the other hand, allocates less to 
former colonies of France. When looking at the EU Institutions, the only colonial 
past that seems to be statistically significant is if the recipient is a former colony of 
France. The EU Institutions and Sweden are also motivated by trade, favour their 
trading partners and allocate more Aid for Trade to them. The negative statistical 
significant estimate for UK (column 5) could potentially be explained by the donor 
allocating to recipient where the country has no ongoing trade relationship, but it 
might want to have in the future. The results suggest that both the recipient need, 
merits and the donors’ self-interest are important factors in explaining the Aid for 
Trade allocation among European donors but differs among the individual 
countries.  
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Table 2. How do European donor allocate Aid for Trade? All observations. Dependent variable: ln Aid for Trade per capita 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
VARIABLES EU OLS France OLS Germany 
OLS 
Sweden OLS UK OLS EU FE France FE Germany FE Sweden FE UK FE
Poverty (t-1) 0.0283*** 0.00242 -0.0103 0.0107 0.0172* -0.000485 -0.00926 0.00267 -0.0261* -0.000326
[0.00563] [0.00886] [0.00767] [0.0143] [0.00949] [0.00619] [0.0134] [0.00881] [0.0140] [0.0170]
Voice and Accountability (t-1) -0.161 -0.142 0.223 0.386 -0.178 -0.158 0.354 -0.161 -1.180** 0.111 
[0.225] [0.414] [0.248] [0.498] [0.313] [0.240] [0.335] [0.294] [0.592] [0.465] 
Rule of Law(t-1) 0.294 0.877 0.202 -0.896 0.796 -0.000661 -0.212 -0.0763 0.257 0.194 
[0.391] [0.677] [0.487] [0.917] [0.593] [0.361] [0.664] [0.305] [0.608] [0.667] 
Political Stability (t-1) -0.134 0.102 0.0191 0.635* -0.470** -0.0808 0.0681 0.0332 0.196 -0.0203
[0.153] [0.285] [0.182] [0.371] [0.210] [0.116] [0.251] [0.136] [0.171] [0.252]
Regulatory Quality (t-1) 0.829*** 0.532 1.006*** 0.759 0.151 0.0429 -0.587 -0.104 -0.828 -1.068*
[0.241] [0.439] [0.305] [0.653] [0.398] [0.298] [0.470] [0.201] [0.502] [0.539]
Control of Corruption (t-1) -0.279 -0.782 -0.211 -0.306 0.000968 1.148*** 0.199 0.222 -0.0273 0.274
[0.282] [0.534] [0.370] [0.730] [0.535] [0.370] [0.583] [0.416] [0.690] [0.821]
Ln Growth (t-1) -0.00305 -0.0282 0.0295* 0.0465 -0.0280 -0.000144 -0.0307* -0.000890 -0.0225 -0.0198
[0.0130] [0.0211] [0.0156] [0.0360] [0.0260] [0.00893] [0.0169] [0.00797] [0.0190] [0.0233]
Trade Openness (t-1) -0.00447 -0.00371 0.00441 0.0198*** 0.00707** 0.00125 0.00693 0.00188 0.00122 -0.00206
[0.00272] [0.00561] [0.00408] [0.00692] [0.00353] [0.00224] [0.00855] [0.00228] [0.00606] [0.00508]
Ln Export (t-1) 0.180* 0.171 -0.0843 0.344* -0.386*** 0.345** 0.254 0.0839 0.102 -0.0346
[0.104] [0.182] [0.0782] [0.197] [0.129] [0.151] [0.202] [0.0634] [0.152] [0.246]
Ln Population -0.848*** -0.675*** 0.0544 -0.643* 0.163 -0.471 -0.699 -1.278** -0.403 -2.210*
[0.106] [0.185] [0.116] [0.335] [0.173] [0.468] [0.859] [0.497] [0.980] [1.172]
Landlocked 0.176 -0.885* 0.665** 1.629** -0.632 - - - - - 
[0.267] [0.450] [0.308] [0.629] [0.386]
Former colony France 0.458* 1.991*** -0.248 -2.732*** -0.767* - - - - - 
[0.268] [0.530] [0.421] [0.731] [0.453]
Former colony UK -0.381 0.527 -0.804** -0.266 1.571*** - - - - - 
[0.319] [0.597] [0.329] [0.701] [0.321]
Former colony Germany -0.296 -0.344 0.168 0.620 0.797** - - - - - 
[0.355] [0.552] [0.385] [0.848] [0.349]
GSP Signatory -0.464 0.169 0.0715 0.873 -0.121 - - - - - 
[0.307] [0.515] [0.371] [0.773] [0.403]
GSP+ Signatory -0.453 -0.520 -0.153 -0.838 -0.124 - - - - - 
[0.334] [0.433] [0.393] [0.746] [0.571]
APEC Member -1.255*** -0.123 -1.325*** -2.198** -0.391 - - - - - 
[0.427] [0.726] [0.436] [0.860] [0.501]
Observations 1,092 776 1,015 713 638 1,092 776 1,015 713 638 
R-squared 0.448 0.302 0.224 0.345 0.267 0.034 0.017 0.015 0.021 0.020 
F-statistics 16.27 8.96 3.99 9.01 9.25 2.00 1.59 1.32 1.43 1.06 
Number of pan_id 116 104 113 102 106 
Clustered(OLS) and robust(FE) standard errors in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0
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Another way to measure the relative importance of our proxies need, merit and self-
interest is to add the variables to the regressions and look at the R-squared value, a 
method used in Hoeffler and Outram (2011). The R-squared values range from 0-1 and 
measures how much explanatory power the explanatory variables has in explaining the 
variation in the dependent variable. As seen in Table 3, population and the other control 
variables can alone explain between 6.3% to 37.9% of the variation for the European 
donors in their Aid for Trade allocations. When adding the recipients need the R-
squared increases only for Germany and UK, which could further indicate that most of 
the European donors are not motivated by the poverty rates in the recipient countries 
when allocating their Aid for Trade. In comparison, the proxies for the recipient merits 
and the donors’ self-interest increases the explanatory power for all the European 
donors. The increased R-squared value when adding merit, export and colonies 
indicates that merit and self-interest could explain more of the variation than the 
recipient needs. It also further indicates that the European donors differs in what 
motivates them.  
Table 3. How much of the variation is explained by need, merit, and self-interest? 
EU Institutions France Germany Sweden United Kingdom 
Control variables 37.9% 21.2% 6.3% 18.5% 3.4% 
Recipients need 35.8% 17.6% 8.7% 18.2% 9.4% 
Recipients merit 40.7% 21.7% 20.2% 24.7% 14.2% 
Export (Self-interest)  43.3% 25.5% 20.2% 27.0% 15.6% 
Colonial past (Self-interest) 44.8% 30.2% 22.4% 34.5% 26.6% 
Our OLS regressions in estimation (1)-(5) may be biased due to unobserved country 
fixed effects that correlate with the error term (such as history, culture, religion etc.).  I 
will control for the time-invariant factors using either a fixed effects or random effects 
estimator. By running a Hausman test on the different European donors, the p-values 
indicate that a fixed effects model is preferred over a random effects model for all the 
donors.7 The fixed effect estimates are presented in columns (6)-(10) in Table 2. When 
running the fixed effect models, most of the estimates changes among the donors, 
indicating there is fixed effect to account for. Sweden is now the only European donor 
motivated by the recipients need in its allocation of Aid for Trade. The European donors 
7 The p-value of the Hausman test: EU Institution 0.0009, France 0, Germany 0, Sweden 0 and UK 0. 
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also seems to be less merit focused, where Sweden gives less aid to recipient with a 
higher level of poverty and a higher level of democracy. The EU Institution allocates 
more to recipients with a higher control of corruption and UK allocates less to recipients 
with higher level of regulatory quality. France allocates less Aid for Trade to countries 
with good economic policies. The only European donors allocating their Aid for Trade 
according to self-interest seems to be the EU Institutions. To see if the fixed effects 
model is preferred over the pooled OLS model, a F-test is conducted on all the European 
donors (as in Hoeffler and Outram, 2011). The F-test is run to test if fixed effects are 
equal to zero. The results of the F-test show that we cannot reject the null hypothesis on 
10% significant level for all European donors except the EU Institutions. The 
conservative fixed effects model is therefore preferred when looking at the EU 
Institutions but for all others, the pooled OLS model with cluster standard errors is 
preferred over the fixed effects model. 
5.1.2 Common observations 
I restrict the sample to only common observations, according to the method prosed 
by Hoeffler and Outram (2011), to be able to overcome the issue that the donor 
equations are estimated using different samples. Many of the observations are dropped 
and only around 25% remains after restricting the sample to only common observations. 
This indicates that the European donor differs from its European counterparts in their 
allocation of Aid for Trade each year and to whom they allocate. The new OLS 
estimates are presented in columns (1)-(5) in Table 4. The estimates for the recipients’ 
merits have changed and the donors seem to allocate even more according to individual 
merit preferences, where the EU Institutions are more motivated by the recipients’ 
merits in comparison to its European counterparts. Removing the observations from the 
sample has no significant impact on the recipient need (except Sweden seems to favour 
poor countries) and colonial past and trade are still significant motivators for the 
European donors. Germany is the only country not allocating Aid for Trade based on 
neither recipients’ merits or needs. The estimation also indicates a “small country bias” 
for EU Institutions and Sweden. 
As for the OLS estimates using all the observations, the OLS regressions using only 
the common observation may be biased due to unobserved fixed effects. Therefore, the 
fixed effects model is used to control for the recipients-specific fixed effect. As for the 
sample with all the observations, a F-test is used to determine if fixed effects are equal 
to zero. The test indicates that we can reject the null-hypothesis on the 5 % level and  
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Table 4. How do European donor allocate Aid for Trade? Common observations. Dependent variable: ln Aid for Trade per capita. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
VARIABLES EU OLS France OLS Germany 
OLS 
Sweden OLS UK OLS EU FE France FE Germany FE Sweden FE UK FE
Poverty (t-1) 0.0279*** 0.00346 -0.00271 0.0281* 0.0203** 0.00333 -0.0376 -0.00470 -0.0438* 0.0130 
[0.00732] [0.0119] [0.00707] [0.0164] [0.00920] [0.0143] [0.0247] [0.0105] [0.0233] [0.0205] 
Voice and Accountability (t-1) -0.512* -0.842 -0.152 0.759 -0.747** -0.178 0.0717 -0.817** -3.266*** 1.554 
[0.274] [0.510] [0.245] [0.501] [0.343] [0.358] [0.879] [0.336] [0.896] [0.989] 
Rule of Law (t-1) 0.926* 0.324 0.507 -1.137 0.288 -0.133 1.041 0.350 -0.462 0.0266 
[0.539] [0.815] [0.456] [1.246] [0.630] [0.535] [1.122] [0.445] [1.172] [0.791] 
Political Stability (t-1) 0.193 0.138 0.228 1.192** -0.0682 0.178 -0.876** -0.309* 0.562 0.0681 
[0.222] [0.341] [0.155] [0.458] [0.217] [0.166] [0.411] [0.158] [0.344] [0.266] 
Regulatory Quality (t-1) 0.00268 0.701 0.465 0.649 -0.394 0.0692 -1.295* 0.276 -0.717 -0.817
[0.388] [0.716] [0.367] [0.948] [0.484] [0.495] [0.738] [0.259] [1.006] [0.770]
Control of Corruption (t-1) -0.630* 0.122 -0.438 -1.206 0.699 0.154 -0.385 -0.496 -0.791 -0.134
[0.369] [0.564] [0.315] [0.970] [0.580] [0.449] [1.129] [0.464] [1.035] [1.133]
Ln Growth (t-1) 0.0233 -0.0628* 0.0380 0.00459 -0.0348 0.00161 -0.0126 0.0116 -0.0347 -0.0253
[0.0297] [0.0348] [0.0237] [0.0488] [0.0297] [0.0273] [0.0231] [0.00759] [0.0248] [0.0236]
Trade Openness (t-1) -0.00607 0.00524 0.00338 0.0129 -0.000935 -0.00129 0.00484 0.000150 0.00120 -0.0137**
[0.00490] [0.00846] [0.00464] [0.00881] [0.00455] [0.00334] [0.00832] [0.00305] [0.00619] [0.00613]
Ln Export (-1) 0.270* 0.0121 0.00182 0.181 -0.263** 0.805** 0.130 0.186** 0.273 0.334 
[0.157] [0.187] [0.0767] [0.303] [0.131] [0.319] [0.402] [0.0768] [0.260] [0.283] 
Ln Population -1.157*** -0.397 -0.135 -0.662* 0.0565 -0.0207 -1.843 -1.488*** -0.806 -3.278***
[0.189] [0.358] [0.125] [0.381] [0.188] [0.785] [1.622] [0.455] [1.413] [1.119]
Landlocked -0.0916 -1.214* 0.434* 1.478* -0.498
[0.395] [0.647] [0.249] [0.848] [0.421]
GSP Signatory 0.00826 2.882*** -0.101 -3.468*** -1.011***
[0.268] [0.679] [0.357] [0.920] [0.371]
GSP+ Signatory -0.495 0.625 -0.438* 0.688 1.345***
[0.342] [0.661] [0.250] [0.728] [0.361]
APEC member 0.111 -0.483 0.0318 0.398 0.700*
[0.403] [0.751] [0.256] [0.899] [0.412]
Former colony France -0.536 -1.004 -0.760** 1.764** -0.482
[0.426] [0.623] [0.293] [0.845] [0.409]
Former colony Germany -0.860 0.0139 0.0642 -1.437 -0.100
[0.534] [0.646] [0.490] [1.107] [0.548]
Former colony UK -0.747 0.310 -0.800** -1.229 -0.320
[0.548] [0.712] [0.399] [1.063] [0.572]
Observations 341 341 341 341 341 341 341 341 341 341 
R-squared 0.585 0.297 0.282 0.422 0.319 0.060 0.049 0.095 0.072 0.062 
F-statistics 17.35 6.58 5.31 10.22 15.03 0.98 2.04 2.83 2.13 2.83 
Number of pan_id 76 76 76 76 76 
*Robust standard errors in brackets*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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that fixed effects are jointly significant for all the European donors (when using 
the sample with only common observations). The time-invariant factors are 
controlled for and the results are presented in columns (6)-(10) in Table 4. Taking 
fixed effects into account changes many coefficients on the explanatory variables. 
Sweden is the only donor motivated by the recipient need but allocates less Aid for 
Trade to poorer recipients. When controlling for fixed effects, the European donors 
seems to be penalizing recipient with higher merits. Sweden and Germany give less 
Aid for Trade to recipients with a high degree of democracy. Germany and France 
allocate less Aid for Trade to recipients with a higher political stability. France 
allocate less Aid for Trade to recipients with higher level of regulatory quality and 
UK gives less to recipients more open to trade. The negative effect found on Aid for 
Trade and recipients merits could be due to donors directing their Aid for Trade to 
recipient which has lower merits (and therefore may be in more need of assistance). 
The European Union and Germany favour their trading partners. The huge cut in 
sample size and the different results indicates that the European donors are driven 
by different motives when allocating its Aid for Trade. 
5.2 How does the European donors differ from the US and 
Japan? 
5.2.1 All observations: The US and Japan 
In the third stage of the empirical analysis, the allocation of the European donors 
will be compared to two other donors outside Europe: The US and Japan. The 
estimates indicate no evidence that Japan or the US are motivated by the recipients 
need or their trade interest when allocating their Aid for Trade. The OLS regressions 
(1)-(2) presented in Table 5 indicate that both Japan and the US seems only to be 
motivated by the recipients’ merits. Japan rewards recipients with higher rule of law 
and economic growth while higher government effectiveness receives significantly 
less Aid for Trade. The US rewards regulatory quality and the level of democracy. 
There’s indication of the small country bias in both estimates.  
What seems to be of statistical significance for both Japan and the US, after 
controlling of fixed effects, is if the recipient is a trade partner. Both donors reward 
their trade partners by more Aid for Trade. Columns (3)-(4) in Table 5 control for 
the country fixed effect potentially biasing the OLS estimates presented in columns 
(1)-(2). As for the sample with European donors, a F-test is used to determine if 
fixed effects are equal to zero. The test indicates that we can reject the null-
hypothesis on the 5% level and the test indicates that fixed effects are significant 
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and the OLS estimations are not valid. In addition to favour its trading partners, 
Japan seems to be responsive to the recipients needs and allocates more Aid for 
Trade to poorer countries. In the case of the US, trade relations are the only variable 
motivating the donor in its Aid for Trade allocation. 
Table 5.  How does the US and Japan allocate their Aid for Trade? Dependent Variable: ln Aid for Trade per capita. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Japan OLS USA OLS Japan FE USA FE 
Poverty (t-1) -0.0103 -0.00614 -0.0221** -0.00144
[0.00741] [0.00786] [0.00873] [0.00778]
Voice and Accountability (t-1) -0.0313 0.498* -0.259 -0.357
[0.254] [0.292] [0.185] [0.300]
Rule of Law(t-1) 1.821*** -0.454 -0.320 0.676
[0.399] [0.515] [0.273] [0.445]
Political Stability (t-1) 0.154 -0.343 0.0972 -0.0374
[0.254] [0.218] [0.125] [0.128]
Regulatory Quality (t-1) -0.769** 1.348*** 0.0470 -0.443
[0.309] [0.318] [0.214] [0.465]
Control of Corruption (t-1) -0.535* -0.406 0.903** -0.344
[0.320] [0.425] [0.355] [0.354]
Ln Growth (t-1) 0.0421*** -0.00239 0.00848 -0.00865
[0.0147] [0.0185] [0.0119] [0.0113]
Trade Openness (t-1) -0.000280 0.00501 -0.00169 0.00270
[0.00338] [0.00436] [0.00255] [0.00376]
Ln Export (t-1) 0.129 -0.165 0.334*** 0.445***
[0.0963] [0.121] [0.0881] [0.134] 
Ln Population -0.452*** -0.300** -0.883 -0.392
[0.132] [0.143] [0.575] [0.695]
Landlocked 0.134 0.471 - - 
[0.285] [0.357] - - 
GSP Signatory 0.828** 0.353 - - 
[0.372] [0.432] - - 
GSP+ Signatory 0.555 0.714* - - 
[0.373] [0.391] - - 
APEC member 0.606 -1.167** - - 
[0.629] [0.534] - - 
Observations 1,166 1,027 1,166 1,027 
R-squared 0.409 0.292 0.063 0.035 
F-statistics 18.86 7.43 3.56 1.94 
Number of pan_id 119 125 
Clustered (OLS) and robust(FE) standard errors in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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5.2.2 Common observations: European donors, US and Japan 
To be able to compare the European donors with Japan and the US, the sample 
will be restricted, and all the non-common observation will be dropped (as in 
Hoeffler and Outram, 2011). As it turns out, no more drops are needed after 
restricting the sample to the European donors to have a sample size with common 
observations for all the donors, including the US and Japan. The results are 
presented in Table 6.  
The European donors’ allocation of Aid for Trade seems to be more motivated 
by the recipients’ merits in comparison to Japan and the US (except the EU 
Institutions) and the European donors give less aid to recipient with higher 
governmental qualities. Economic growth and trade openness are factors that do not 
seem to motivate any of the donors (except UK which allocates significantly less to 
recipient more open to trade).  Japan is also motivated by the recipients’ merits, but 
not to the same extent as the European donors and gives less Aid for Trade to more 
democratic recipients.  There’s mixed indications of motivation according to a 
recipient need: Sweden and Japan are the only donors motivated by poverty but 
allocates less Aid for Trade to poorer countries. What seems to be of statistically 
significance for the EU Institutions and the US is not need, nor merit. In comparison 
to the other donors, the only significant parameters are self-interest. The more trade 
the EU Institutions and US has with a recipient, the more Aid for Trade the recipient 
receives. Self-interest is nothing characteristic only to the US and EU Institutions, 
Germany and Japan are also giving more Aid for Trade to their trade partners.  
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Table 6. How do the donors differ? Common observations. Dependent variable: ln Aid for Trade per capita. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES EU FE France FE Germany FE Japan FE Sweden FE UK FE USA FE 
Poverty (t-1) 0.00333 -0.0376 -0.00470 -0.0345* -0.0438* 0.0130 0.00663 
[0.0143] [0.0247] [0.0105] [0.0186] [0.0233] [0.0205] [0.00975] 
Voice and Accountability (t-1) -0.178 0.0717 -0.817** -0.842* -3.266*** 1.554 0.352 
[0.358] [0.879] [0.336] [0.447] [0.896] [0.989] [0.524] 
Rule of Law (t-1) -0.133 1.041 0.350 -0.0325 -0.462 0.0266 -0.358
[0.535] [1.122] [0.445] [0.469] [1.172] [0.791] [0.451]
Political Stability (t-1) 0.178 -0.876** -0.309* -0.124 0.562 0.0681 0.183
[0.166] [0.411] [0.158] [0.187] [0.344] [0.266] [0.159]
Government Effectiveness (t-1) 0.0692 -1.295* 0.276 -0.539 -0.717 -0.817 0.0763
[0.495] [0.738] [0.259] [0.403] [1.006] [0.770] [0.365]
Regulatory Quality (t-1) 0.154 -0.385 -0.496 0.0164 -0.791 -0.134 0.649
[0.449] [1.129] [0.464] [0.511] [1.035] [1.133] [0.734]
Ln Growth (t-1) 0.00161 -0.0126 0.0116 0.0320 -0.0347 -0.0253 -0.00768
[0.0273] [0.0231] [0.00759] [0.0256] [0.0248] [0.0236] [0.0240]
Trade Openness (t-1) -0.00129 0.00484 0.000150 -0.000779 0.00120 -0.0137** 0.00423
[0.00334] [0.00832] [0.00305] [0.00334] [0.00619] [0.00613] [0.00415]
Ln Export (t-1) 0.805** 0.130 0.186** 0.594*** 0.273 0.334 0.353* 
[0.319] [0.402] [0.0768] [0.178] [0.260] [0.283] [0.187] 
Ln Population -0.0207 -1.843 -1.488*** -1.390* -0.806 -3.278*** -1.676**
[0.785] [1.622] [0.455] [0.759] [1.413] [1.119] [0.641]
Observations 341 341 341 341 341 341 341 
R-squared 0.060 0.049 0.095 0.141 0.072 0.062 0.060 
F-statistics 0.98 2.04 2.83 1.86 2.13 2.83 1.76 
Number of pan_id 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 
Robust standard errors in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. 
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5.3 Robustness tests and discussion 
5.3.1 Robustness tests on the European donors 
Too see if my results are robust, I conduct several sensitivity tests using the 
sample with all observations and OLS-regressions (since they are preferred over the 
fixed effect model). 
The results are robust to various specification of governmental merits, except the 
poverty level for UK loses significance when removing either Rule of Law or 
Political Stability. The results are also robust when running the regressions without 
the variable proxying good economic policies, GDP per capita growth. Additionally, 
the results are robust when running the regression using the unmanipulated poverty 
data (see Appendix 3). The estimated results on poverty (not all European donors 
are motivated by poverty) contrast with the results in Hoeffler and Outram (2011). 
Their results indicated that all the major donors are allocating development aid to 
poorer countries, when measuring poverty as GDP per capita. Instead of using the 
poverty headcount ratio, I therefore run the regressions using GDP per capita, which 
normally is used as proxy for a recipient need (e.g., Alesina and Dollar, 2000; 
Hoeffler and Outram, 2011).  The new estimates indicate that the European donors 
are more poverty focused where all the donors, except France, allocate more Aid for 
Trade to poorer recipients (see Appendix 4). This could mean that using national 
income as a proxy for development need yields different results than actual poverty 
data or that Aid for Trade is treated differently than development aid but could also 
mean that GDP per capita is a bad measurement to use when looking at trade related 
assistance. Countries may want to give more Aid for Trade to recipients with higher 
GDP per capita because of potential future trade gains, and therefore the variable 
might be misleading as proxy for need and affects the estimates in the regressions 
(since more Aid for Trade might lead to higher GDP per capita, which leads to more 
Aid for Trade etc.). However, the positive aspect of using GDP per capita as a proxy 
for need is that the data contains less missing observations than actual poverty data. 
The donors also seem to be motivated differently by needs and merits when 
allocating Aid for Trade to countries outside Africa. Since Africa has been argued 
to be special in terms of donor-recipients relationship (Moyo, 2009; Bourguignon 
and Sundberg, 2007; Goldsmith, 2001), I drop the African countries from the 
sample. Restricting the sample changes the results (see Appendix 5). For countries 
outside Africa, the poverty level of the recipient country seems only to matter for 
Germany and both the EU Institutions and UK are no longer allocating more Aid 
for Trade to poorer countries. The European donors are also less motivated by the 
governmental merits and only higher regulatory quality is rewarded by the EU 
Institutions, Germany and the UK. The European donors are still motivated by their 
self-interest. Colonial past is still significant for all the donors and Sweden and UK 
are still rewarding their trade partners. The result indicates that countries in Africa 
are treated differently regarding needs and merits. 
5.3.2 Discussion 
The results are not clear or straightforward and the European donors does not 
seem to be motivated by the same factors. One reason could be that many factors 
that plays a role cannot be easily measured. The relationship between aid and 
poverty reduction is complex and it is difficult to establish causation due to many 
things coincide and correlates. Even if donors are European they are still individual 
countries driven by their own motives, the majority not captured by the estimations. 
However, what seems to be a motivation for all the countries is colonial past. In 
Table 2, column (1)-(5), former colony owners France and UK allocates more to 
their former colonies, but the EU Institutions is also motivated by the colonial past 
of France. These results could be due to the internal politics within the EU 
Institutions and could indicate that France may have an influential role in the Aid 
for Trade allocation process. Germany, on the other hand, does not give more aid to 
its former colonies. This may reflect how close the colonial past is, Germany lost 
all is colonies in 1918 and France and UK had their colonies up until 1997. The last 
colony of France in the dataset is Vanatau, which gained its independence in 1980, 
and for UK Brunei, which gained its independence in 1984. Other than colonial past, 
the European donors seems to be motivated differently by need, merit and self-
interest. These results are not surprising due to the European Union being a highly 
cultural diverse region and the countries are probably driven by different motives 
even if sharing a common Aid for Trade strategy. The limits to my approach are 
therefore many.  
The methodology poses significant challenges to determine the allocation of the 
donors, especially due to a potential sample selection problem because not all 
donors give aid to all countries (for a further discussion see McGillivray, 2002). To 
account for the problem, either a two stage Heckman model or the Tobit estimator 
is normally used. Very few studies using a Tobit estimator or Heckman model 
have 
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resulted in findings that differ significantly from the estimation made by OLS.8 
Therefore, I have decided not to use a Heckman model or a Tobit estimator, but the 
estimates could still be biased. Additionally, I follow the method set out in Hoeffler 
and Outram (2011) and restrict the sample to only common observations in Table 4 
and 6, but the approach of having only common observation has a major drawback. 
By restricting the observations the coefficients loose information about the true 
allocation behaviour of the European donors, Japan and the US. The huge cut in 
sample size and the different results indicates that the European donors are driven 
by different motives and allocates their Aid for Trade differently each year. 
Therefore, there might be problem with a sample selection bias from a non-random 
subsample in the estimates presented in Table 4 and 6. Because of the big sample 
drop (deleting 75% of the sample size), and due to the potential bias, the samples 
using all the observations will be preferred (Table 2 and 5). The time and lags (one 
year) decided in the methodology might not also be correct for many of the variables 
since it can take a few years before the donors react. Longer lags on the lagged 
variables could then have resulted in different estimates.  
Another limitation to my approach is the fact that donors’ decisions might not be 
independent from each other. Donors’ may seek to complement or coordinate each 
other’s actions, or they could be otherwise influenced by others (e.g., Sweden and 
UK could be giving less to former colonies of France because France is giving their 
colonies more). There are many aspects adding to the complexity of the problem, 
making it difficult to establish causality and unbiased estimates. 
Another limitation to my study is the availability and nature of the data. The 
complexity of the problem makes it challenging to find data to proxy need, merit 
and self-interest. Data on poverty and governmental merits is sometime limited due 
to developing countries being exposed to political instability and conflicts, and there 
is no accepted objective measurement of governmental qualities. The WGI are 
criticised for being too complex and not easy to replicate (Kaufmann et al., 2007). 
Additionally, I only use trade and colonial past to proxy a donors’ self-interest, a 
concept probably much broader. There is also exclusion of trade in services in the 
export data, but due to the sample containing developing countries, the potential 
bias resulting from the exclusion should be modest.  
The measurement of the dependent variable also imposes challenges. The CRS 
data base is recognized as being the best existing data source for Aid for Trade 
flows, but it also has its limitations. The database is made up by aid flows from 
members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and excludes some of 
the multilateral agencies and major donors such as China and non-European DAC 
8 See McGillivray and White (1993), Alesina and Dollar (2000), Hoeffler and Outram (2011), 
McGillivray (2002), Thiele et al. (2007), Berthélemy (2006a, b) and Fleck and Kilby (2010) 
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members. Second, it could be likely that the QWIDS data set is overestimating the 
Aid for Trade volumes since they include projects that potentially could have no 
impact on the recipients’ capacity to trade or no objectives related to trade at all. 
The CSR data can tell how much aid that went to a specific sector but cannot show 
the impact of the project on trade performance.  
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The potential of Aid for Trade to eradicate poverty has been highly recognized 
and the popularity among policy makers and development organization has grown 
since the initiative started. Earlier studies regarding development aid has found that 
aid is motivated by the needs and merit of the recipient countries, but that self-
interest tend to outweigh other motives of the donor. I revisit this question using Aid 
for Trade data between 2005-2015 and investigate how the largest donor in the 
world, the European donors, allocate their Aid for Trade. The results are not straight 
forward and clear, indicating that the complexity of the problem makes it difficult 
to establish causation. Additionally, the European donors seem to be motivated 
differently by need, merit and self-interest even if sharing a common strategy. 
However, my results indicate that most of the European donors are not motivated 
by the recipient need but rather by self-interest, even if the European donors claims 
to be driven by altruistic motives. I find indications that the colonial past is 
statistically significant among all the European donors, where UK and France 
allocate more Aid for Trade to its former colonies. These results correspond to 
earlier studies of development aid, where especially France favouring its old 
colonies (Alesina and Dollar, 2000). Most of the European donors also seem to be 
motivated by trade and all the European donors are motivated differently by the 
governmental qualities. 
 I also find indications that the recipients are treated differently depending on 
their geographical location. If a recipient is in Africa, the donors are motivated 
differently by need and merit and there is probably other heterogenous effects in 
other geographical locations. As in Hoeffler and Outram (2011), I found unobserved 
country fixed effects to be significant for some of the donors when using a restricted 
sample. All these results indicate that there is still a poor understanding of donors’ 
behaviour and what motivates them in the allocation of aid.  
However, there are indication that the European donors are somewhat motivated 
differently than Japan and US. The European Aid for Trade allocation seems to be 
more altruistic in comparison to the US (except the EU Institutions). The US seem 
6 Conclusions and further research 
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to be placing no importance on either the recipient merit or need, and only be 
focusing on trade. However, Japan seem to be more motivated by the need of the 
recipient than the European donor and allocates more Aid for Trade to poorer 
countries. On the other hand, Japan also favour its trading partners. All these results 
indicate that there is still a poor understanding of donors’ behaviour and what 
motivates them in the allocation of aid. Further research is needed both to investigate 
what motivates donors in aid allocation but also how (and if) the aid allocation 
process differs between development aid and Aid for Trade.  
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Appendix 1. Summary Statistics. Recipients need and merits between 2005-2015. 
VARIABLES Africa Asia Americas Europe Middle East Oceania All 
Voice and Accountability 
Observations 550 308 341 132 99 132 1562 
Min. value -2.226 -2.259 -1.887 -1.767 -1.907 -1.106 -2.259
Max. value 0.970 0.746 1.293 1.092 0.774 1.217 1.293
Mean Value -0.581 -0.763 0.281 0.101 -0.897 0.543 -.296
Standard deviation 0.706 0.757 0.676 0.656 0.695 0.563 .849
Political Stability 
Observations 550 308 341 132 99 132 1562 
Min. value -2.699 -2.810 -2.056 2.021 -2.827 -0.926 -2.827
Max. value 1.200 1.283 1.285 1.148 0.946 1.454 1.454
Mean Value -0.465 -0.628 -0.022 -0.005 -1.178 0.783 -0.301
Standard deviation 0.814 0.878 0.702 0.599 0.970 0.610 0.903
Regulatory Quality 
Observations 550 308 341 132 99 132 1562 
Min. value -2.243 -2.268 -1.885 -1.623 -1.720 -1.405 -2.268
Max. value 1.127 1.113 1.539 1.423 1.317 0.29 1.539
Mean Value -0.643 -0.534 -0.003 0.079 -0.225 -0.746 -0.403
Standard deviation 0.580 0.708 0.725 0.636 0.832 0.357 0.714
Government Effectiveness 
Observations 550 308 341 132 99 132 1562 
Min. value -1.848 -1.6179 -2.041 -1.13 -1.719 -1.60 -2.041
Max. value 1.049 1.267 1.572 1.564 1.392 0.509 1.572
Mean Value -0.710 -0.402 -0.059 -0.003 -0.269 -0.591 -0.410
Standard deviation 0.596 0.675 0.684 0.702 0.767 0.392 0.696
Rule of Law 
Observations 550 308 341 132 99 132 1562 
Min. value -1.852 -1.897 -2.032 -1.334 -1.838 -1.086 -2.032
Max. value 1.029 1.029 1.433 1.216 1.162 1.272 1.433
Mean Value -0.644 -0.603 -0.211 -0.141 -0.330 0.115 -0.415
Standard Deviations 0.595 0.629 0.782 0.629 0.802 0.612 0.711
8 Appendix 
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Continuation of Appendix 1. 
VARIABLES Africa Asia Americas Europe Middle East Oceania All 
Control of Corruption 
Observations 550 308 341 132 99 132 1562 
Min. value -1.773 -1.673 -1.40 -1.13 -1.56 -1.34 -1.773
Max. value 1.16 1.28 1.72 1.25 1.01 0.77 1.72
Mean value -0.586 -0.69 -0.02 -0.14 -0.33 -0.25 -0.401
Standard Deviations 0.588 0.583 0.79 0.61 0.70 0.40 0.68
GDP per capita growth (annual %) 
Observations 550 308 341 132 99 132 1562 
Min. value -36.83 -15.421 -13.143 -14.421 -29.886 -9.655 -36.83
Max. value 18.30 33.03 12.950 13.830 10.288 34.794 34.794
Mean Value 2.309 5.166 2.317 2.827 0.787 2.834 2.866
Standard deviation 4.216 4.609 3.524 4.452 5.068 7.493 4.756
Trade (% of GDP) 
Observations 550 308 341 132 99 132 1562 
Min. value 0 .167 22.106 69.591 32.727 0 0 
Max. value 2.31 203.85 203.829 157.974 147.539 165.110 311.4 
Mean Value 80.25 85.11 79.53 103.3 81.55 90.39 83.94 
Standard deviation 40.23 41.25 30.55 20.60 22.51 45.18 37.29 
Poverty at 1.90$ a day 
Observations 517 297 220 132 77 110 1353 
Min. value 0.4 0 0 0 0 0.6 0 
Max. value 78.5 43 27.8 19.6 19.8 45.6 78.5 
Mean Value 37.51 9.67 7.05 2.41 2.71 12.12 18.98 
Standard deviation 23.57 10.41 6.33 4.82 5.17 13.03 21.89 
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Appendix 2. Summary Statistics. Donors export and Aid for Trade between 2005-2015 
VARIABLES Africa Asia Americas Europe Middle 
East 
Oceania 
European Union 
Aid for Trade (2015 USD millions) 
Observations 550 308 341 132 99 132 
Min. value 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max. value 607.6 2317 299.7 680.63 75.08 16.36 
Mean Value 27.63 41.13 9.108 50.07 6.659 1.272 
Standard deviation 49.73 261.2 23.30 102.1 13.15 2.635 
Export to recipient (USD millions) 
Observations 550 308 341 132 99 132 
Min. value 0 7.953 20.59 0 48.83 0.1 
Max. value 36,496 217,443 53,177 14,892.7 4,5479.5 2,067.4 
Mean Value 3,132 13,847 3,809 3,177 9,572 104.6 
Standard deviation 6,438 32,673 8,797 3,894 10,846 285.1 
France 
Aid for Trade (2015 USD millions) 
Observations 550 308 341 132 99 132 
Min. value 0 -0.697 0 0 0 0 
Max. value 312.9 179 366.42 17.43 113.29 5.9 
Mean Value 11.16 8.132 5.451 0.521 3.367 0.124 
Standard deviation 30.86 23.47 26.96 2.066 13.40 0.729 
Export to recipient (USD millions) 
Observation 550 308 341 132 99 132 
Min. value 0.036 0.033 0.79 0 4.85 0 
Max. value 8,175 21,469 6,297 1,741.23 5,190.5 401.4 
Mean Value 649.7 1,474 429.6 360.5 1,108 8.504 
Standard deviation 1,367 3,312 998.1 435.0 1,139 37.86 
Germany 
Aid for Trade (2015 USD millions) 
Observations 550 308 341 132 99 132 
Min. value 0 0 0 0 -0.25 0 
Max. value 358.65 963.78 286.96 103.61 7.65 2.59 
Mean Value 9.022 32.16 6.9 11.00 0.939 0.0575 
Standard deviation 26.05 88.04 24.41 17.75 1.565 0.249 
Export to recipient (USD millions) 
Observations 550 308 341 132 99 132 
Min. value 0.423 0.033 0.89 0 4.85 0 
Max. value 12,172 99,196 15,631 7,768.6 12,338.6 756.47 
Mean Value 568.5 3,636 830.4 1,175 1,885 19.70 
Standard deviation 1,507 12,058 2,343 1,659 2,576 90.18 
United Kingdom 
Aid for Trade (2015 USD millions) 
Observations 550 308 341 132 99 132 
Min. value -0.782 0 -1.79 0 0 0 
Max. value 158.06 203.73 76.14 3.33 43.45 1.27 
Mean value 6.027 12.54 1.296 0.178 1.605 0.0296 
Standard deviation 15.52 30.25 6.510 0.508 5.738 0.154 
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Appendix 2. Continuation. 
VARIABLES Africa Asia Americas Europe Middle 
East 
Oceania 
Export to recipient (USD millions) 
Observations 550 308 341 132 99 132 
Min. value 0.127 0.2 3.68 0 1.67 0 
Max. value 6,846 27,625 5,902 1,927.9 8,300.4 84.57 
Mean value 281.1 1,392 294.8 263.2 1,082 5.392 
Standard devation 738.3 3,251 714.1 322.2 1,610 13.12 
Sweden 
Aid for Trade (2015 USD millions) 
Observations 550 308 341 132 99 132 
Min. value -.119773 -18.25 -0.07 -0.007 -0.0003 -0.0004
Max. value 43.88607 12.96 10.22 17.45 7.48 .0006
Mean value 1.944 0.776 0.397 2.385 0.669 1.79e-06 
Standard deviation 5.515 2.366 1.485 3.498 1.554 6.36e-05 
Export to recipient (USD millions) 
Observations 550 308 341 132 99 132 
Min. value 0 0 0.09 0 0 0 
Max. value 1573 6,061 2,015 708.99 1,931.1 23.84 
Mean value 83.62 413.3 114.5 100.4 317.2 1.550 
Standard deviation 206.6 951.7 265.4 134.1 449.6 4.201 
Japan 
Aid for Trade (2015 USD millions) 
Observations 550 308 341 132 99 132 
Min. value 0 0 0 0 0 0.14 
Max. value 218.27 1,321 53.44 73.39 542.82 17.7 
Mean value 10.37 120.9 4.360 3.091 16.03 4.493 
Standard deviation 22.44 225.0 7.631 10.01 66.31 4.174 
Export to recipient (USD millions) 
Observations 550 308 341 132 99 132 
Min. value .03 0.54 2.76 0 0.16 0.09 
Max. value 4,627.72 162,035 15,524.9 2,026.1 8,228.3 1,984.5 
Mean value 212.0 9,563 1,061 121.1 1,464 126.2 
Standard deviation 607.4 24,989 2,596 248.9 2,049 343.7 
United States 
Aid for Trade (2015 USD millions) 
Observations 550 308 341 132 99 132 
Min. value 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max. value 367.77 1,392 130.35 138.61 3,148.9 26.56 
Mean value 15.62 45.49 10.34 17.52 108.5 0.662 
Standard deviation 40.03 169.1 22.21 26.49 475.5 3.357 
Export to recipient (USD millions) 
Observations 550 308 341 132 99 132 
Min. value 0.11 123,675 59.0923 0 0.351 .04246 
Max. value 367.76 7,105 240247.1 2,136.8 19,738.9 391.38 
Mean value 541.9 7,105 9,940 246.5 3,629 35.60 
Standard deviation 1,272 18,353 32,357 395.3 5,392 56.84 
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Robust standard errors in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Appendix 3. OLS regression using unmanipulated poverty data 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES EU OLS France OLS Germany OLS Sweden OLS UK OLS 
Poverty(t-1) 0.0316*** 0.0135 -0.00591 0.0386 0.0234* 
[0.00819] [0.0146] [0.0138] [0.0260] [0.0140] 
Voice and Accountability (t-1) -0.124 -0.746 -0.0905 0.00335 -0.858**
[0.347] [0.549] [0.371] [0.748] [0.338]
Rule of Law(t-1) 0.195 0.758 0.466 -0.927 2.168***
[0.511] [1.144] [0.592] [1.119] [0.809]
Political Stability (t-1) -0.264 0.0394 -0.247 0.413 0.0678
[0.265] [0.366] [0.241] [0.489] [0.255]
Government Effectiveness (t-1) -0.487 -0.757 -0.158 -1.027 -0.665
[0.534] [1.102] [0.693] [1.322] [0.639]
Regulatory Quality (t-1) 0.573 0.806 0.731 1.216 -0.0124
[0.366] [0.900] [0.536] [0.903] [0.565]
Control of Corruption (t-1) 0.0202 -0.0348 0.186 0.144 -0.403
[0.544] [0.726] [0.508] [1.004] [0.653]
Ln Growth (t-1) -0.00408 -0.0346 0.0208 0.0352 -0.0344
[0.0239] [0.0480] [0.0231] [0.0587] [0.0461]
Trade Openess (t-1) -0.00822 -0.00888 -0.00415 0.0234** 0.000649
[0.00550] [0.00780] [0.00660] [0.0113] [0.00498]
Ln Export (t-1) 0.443*** 0.115 -0.0113 0.178 -0.475***
[0.158] [0.242] [0.108] [0.275] [0.149]
Ln Population -1.180*** -0.563* -0.334* -0.648 0.271 
[0.156] [0.322] [0.201] [0.407] [0.186] 
Landlocked 0.550* -1.450** 0.924** 1.267 -0.884*
[0.328] [0.674] [0.454] [0.788] [0.445]
Former colony France 0.0813 1.690* -0.868 -3.808*** -1.723**
[0.342] [0.874] [0.659] [1.122] [0.762]
Former colony UK -0.294 -0.104 -0.589 0.399 1.574***
[0.384] [0.711] [0.380] [0.831] [0.520]
Former colony Germany -0.0576 -1.139 -0.212 -0.184 0.531 
[0.422] [0.840] [0.573] [1.001] [0.582] 
GSP Signatory -0.298 0.154 0.0181 0.236 -0.134
[0.453] [0.535] [0.512] [1.187] [0.554]
GSP+ Signatory -0.255 0.0725 -0.0291 -1.113 0.400
[0.444] [0.623] [0.606] [1.142] [0.666]
APEC member -0.412 0.0836 -0.0657 -1.337 -0.0151
[0.437] [0.636] [0.449] [1.055] [0.529]
Observations 390 297 402 283 252 
R-squared 0.443 0.202 0.234 0.381 0.276 
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Appendix 4. OLS regression using GDP per capita as proxy for recipient need. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES EU OLS France OLS Germany OLS Sweden OLS UK OLS 
GDP per capita constant 2010 USD (t-1) -1.125*** -0.405 -0.804*** -1.198*** -0.588**
[0.161] [0.362] [0.204] [0.420] [0.254]
Voice and Accountability (t-1) 0.0324 0.0592 0.131 0.459 0.0744
[0.191] [0.399] [0.235] [0.439] [0.302]
Rule of Law(t-1) -0.0151 0.660 0.138 -1.772* 0.402
[0.321] [0.749] [0.486] [1.065] [0.620]
Political Stability (t-1) 0.0527 0.0105 0.144 0.609 -0.468**
[0.136] [0.282] [0.186] [0.372] [0.223]
Government Effectiveness (t-1) -0.200 0.215 -0.450 0.473 -0.646
[0.380] [0.722] [0.520] [1.041] [0.576]
Regulatory Quality (t-1) 0.878*** 0.425 1.178*** 0.949 0.394
[0.242] [0.515] [0.326] [0.618] [0.433]
Control of Corruption (t-1) 0.0392 -0.760 0.0456 0.210 0.525
[0.264] [0.511] [0.342] [0.683] [0.520]
Ln Growth (t-1) 0.00582 -0.00827 0.0401** 0.0534 -0.0130
[0.0156] [0.0219] [0.0170] [0.0344] [0.0255]
Trade Openess (t-1) -0.00530** -0.00495 0.00196 0.0162** 0.00666
[0.00231] [0.00542] [0.00381] [0.00649] [0.00403]
Ln Export (t-1) 0.359*** 0.298 0.191** 0.651*** -0.166
[0.0963] [0.234] [0.0882] [0.187] [0.146]
Ln Population -1.006*** -0.884*** -0.208 -0.986*** 0.0969
[0.102] [0.224] [0.129] [0.307] [0.206]
Landlocked 0.141 -0.844* 0.586* 1.593*** -0.153
[0.222] [0.435] [0.300] [0.574] [0.354]
Former colony France 0.323 1.689** -0.872** -2.821*** -0.691
[0.244] [0.674] [0.439] [0.716] [0.486]
Former colony UK -0.221 0.592 -1.024*** -0.237 1.474***
[0.253] [0.535] [0.326] [0.684] [0.307]
Former colony Germany -0.242 -0.544 -0.259 0.230 0.873**
[0.295] [0.506] [0.377] [0.780] [0.352]
GSP Signatory -1.062*** -0.139 -0.812** 0.324 -0.320
[0.262] [0.587] [0.351] [0.772] [0.371]
GSP+ Signatory -0.220 -0.442 0.514 -0.629 -0.0132
[0.276] [0.460] [0.335] [0.646] [0.527]
APEC member -0.768** 0.149 -0.788* -1.859** -0.0675
[0.387] [0.721] [0.399] [0.793] [0.532]
Observations 1,217 809 1,060 736 673 
R-squared 0.511 0.324 0.241 0.377 0.270 
Robust standard errors in brackets*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Robust standard errors in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Appendix 5. OLS regression excluding African recipient in the sample. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Ln AfT per capita Ln AfT per capita Ln AfT per capita Ln AfT per capita Ln AfT per capita 
Poverty(t-1) 0.0188 0.0279 0.0425*** 0.0585 0.0288 
[0.0168] [0.0273] [0.0148] [0.0374] [0.0216] 
Voice and Accountability (t-1) -0.0345 -0.538 0.266 -0.522 -0.136
[0.318] [0.496] [0.269] [0.760] [0.339]
Rule of Law(t-1) -0.00236 1.025 0.524 0.422 1.102
[0.480] [0.917] [0.531] [1.169] [0.767]
Political Stability (t-1) -0.116 -0.0218 -0.0604 0.298 -0.206
[0.191] [0.371] [0.244] [0.442] [0.266]
Control of Corruption (t-1) -0.133 -0.853 -0.365 -1.729 -0.637
[0.376] [0.812] [0.443] [1.055] [0.677]
Regulatory Quality (t-1) 0.874*** 0.935 0.978** 0.0497 0.984*
[0.329] [0.627] [0.382] [0.796] [0.497]
Ln Growth (t-1) 0.0110 -0.0322 0.0381** 0.0647 0.00821
[0.0181] [0.0345] [0.0156] [0.0430] [0.0339]
Trade Openess (t-1) -0.00491 -0.00441 -0.00293 0.0145 0.00554
[0.00460] [0.00832] [0.00484] [0.0103] [0.00481]
Ln Export (t-1) 0.211 0.0132 -0.0411 0.483* -0.753***
[0.135] [0.215] [0.0995] [0.287] [0.144]
Ln Population -1.000*** -0.579** -0.327* -1.385*** 0.591***
[0.130] [0.269] [0.176] [0.378] [0.202]
Landlocked 0.0705 -1.494* 1.371*** 0.347 -0.352
[0.454] [0.803] [0.483] [0.911] [0.550]
Former colony France 0.926* 1.467* -0.625 -2.490* -2.672***
[0.547] [0.872] [0.870] [1.251] [0.826]
Former colony UK -0.490 -0.795 -0.575 -0.745 1.302**
[0.486] [0.756] [0.470] [1.149] [0.493]
Former colony Germany -0.641 -4.412*** -2.631*** -5.700*** 0.607 
[0.635] [1.431] [0.714] [1.543] [1.018] 
GSP Signatory -0.429 0.929 0.737 -0.866 0.423 
[0.474] [0.586] [0.506] [1.156] [0.450] 
GSP+ Signatory -0.257 -0.908 -0.642 0.375 -0.496
[0.407] [0.683] [0.456] [0.985] [0.642]
APEC member -0.762* -0.134 -0.406 -0.947 -0.583
[0.450] [0.649] [0.472] [0.827] [0.610]
Observations 632 413 615 410 365 
F-statistics 19.44 . 8.11 9.53 11.01 
R-squared 0.493 0.251 0.380 0.411 0.279 
